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ABSTRACT
In recent years collaborative editing systems such as wikis,
GoogleDocs and version control systems became very popu-
lar. In order to improve reliability, fault-tolerance and avail-
ability shared data is replicated in these systems. User misbe-
haviors can make the system inconsistent or bring corrupted
updates to replicated data. Solutions to secure data history of
state-based replication exist, however they are hardly applied
to operation-based replication. In this paper we propose an
approach to secure log in operation-based optimistic replica-
tion system. authenticators based on hash values and digital
signatures are generated each time a site shares or receives
new updates on replicas. authenticators secure logs with se-
curity properties of integrity and authenticity. We present in
detail algorithms to construct and verify authenticators and
we analyse their complexities.
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INTRODUCTION
Collaboration is a key requirement of teams of individuals
working together towards some common goal. In recent years
collaborative editing systems such as wikis, GoogleDocs and
version control systems became very popular. In order to im-
prove reliability, fault-tolerance and availability, shared data
is replicated in these systems. As shared data is mutable, con-
sistency among the different replicas must be ensured. Rather
than adopting a pessimistic replication mechanism that blocks
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access to a replica until it is provable up-to-date, these sys-
tems adopt an optimistic replication approach [13] that allows
replicas to diverge during a short time period. The consis-
tency model for optimistic replication is called eventual con-
sistency, meaning that replicas are guaranteed to converge to
the same value when the system is idle.
Optimistic replication can be classified into state-based and
operation-based [5]. In state-based replication each site ap-
plies updates to its replica without maintaining a change log.
Usually in systems adopting a state-based replication, ev-
ery site sends its local state to other replicas that can merge
the received state with their own state. Systems that use
operation-based replication keep modifications performed on
the replica in a log which is then sent to the other replicas.
Operation-based approaches are used when cost to transfer
state is high such as databases, mobile systems and when
operation-semantics is important. In this work we target sys-
tems that use operation-based replication.
However, in operation-based replication systems users can
misbehave and propagate incorrect contents to other users
such as falsifying the causal order of the operations or re-
moving some contents which are not allowed to be removed.
Some mechanisms for securing operation-based logs exist [7,
3], but they are not adapted for optimistic replication where
concurrent modifications can be done in parallel on the repli-
cas. A mechanism for securing changes in optimistic repli-
cation was proposed in [4], but it is applicable only for state-
based replication.
In the domain of data security, security properties [10] are de-
fined including confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, access
control, availability. For the purpose of preventing log tam-
pering, in this paper we consider two of these security proper-
ties: integrity and authenticity. We informally consider such
security properties as follows:
• Integrity. Adversaries cannot forge an event of document
such as modify content or introduce new forged events to
document log without being detected. Integrity is the most
important required property for securing operation-based
replication. Securing the individual document can be done
by using cryptographic signatures or checksums. However,
ensuring the integrity of a replicated document represented
by a log of operations is more difficult as operations cross
multi-contributors and some of them might be adversaries.
• Authenticity. Any user in a system can verify the validity
of events in a log. Adversaries are made accountable for
unauthorized actions. This property can be done by using
non-repudiation digital signatures such as RSA or DSA.
Traditionally, hashes are used to ensure integrity of any data
object. However, in replication systems this data object
changes due to the contributions of distributed users. Thus a
tamper-evident update history is maintained to mitigate secu-
rity challenges. Such histories containing record information
of the updates that have been performed on the replicas along
with the causal orderings of these updates are constructed in
the manner that any tampering to previous version of replicas
will be detected at other replica sites.
In this paper, we present scenarios that expose vulnerabilities
of operation-based replication and then present an approach
named to create authenticators that prevent users from tam-
pering logs. authenticators detect if original data was modi-
fied or operations were reordered. Our solution ensures the
integrity of shared documents in an operation-based replica-
tion system and the authenticity of user changes.
The structure of the paper is organized as follows. Section
summaries related work in the domain of securing logs in
distributed systems. Section introduces operation-based op-
timistic replication and conceptual operation-based model.
Section presents algorithms to secure logs by authenticators
along with their construction and verification. And Section
concludes the paper.
RELATED WORK
Logging systems and audit logs are very useful and widely
used in distributed systems, however existing approaches
with log auditing and authenticator do not work for repli-
cation systems, particular for operation-based replication.
Among these approaches, Peterson et al. presents an ap-
proach to secure version history in a versioning file system
[12]. The approach proposed a design of a system based on
generating message authentication codes (MACs) for versions
and archiving them with a third party. A file system commits
to a version history when it presents a MAC to the third party
and at a later time, an auditor can verify this history. Thus
it requires that the system trusts the third party that maintains
MACs correctly. In our system we do not rely on a third party
and any user can perform a log auditing mechanism.
Secure audit logs based on hash chains and signatures have
been widely used. Most of existing proposals are not suitable
to apply directly to operation-based replication. Kang et al.
proposed SHH [4] for optimistic replication using hash val-
ues inMerkle tree as revision identifiers to protect causality of
version history. By ensuring decentralized ordering correct-
ness, SHH can guarantee that all updates are not vulnerable
to a decentralized ordering attack. However SHH cannot en-
sure the integrity of data contents to verify update is good or
forged. The sender signature can not be included in generat-
ing summary hash since that makes summary hashes different
even if the merged versions are identical, thus it makes repli-
cas divergence. Thus it cannot provide the authenticity prop-
erty. Similar approaches to SHH in which hashes are used
as identifiers are implemented in distributed version control
systems such as Git history [6] and Mercurial history [11].
In other related works such as secure provenance [3], secure
timeline [8], secure logging [7], secure cooperative XML up-
dates [9], the proposals address problem of handling infor-
mation flow in highly distributed manner. However they only
consider one-path of updating process rather than multi-paths
with reconciliation as in collaborative editing.
OPERATION-BASED REPLICATION
In this section, we first start by presenting operation-based
model in the context of our system. Then we will look into
the vulnerabilities that could arise in replicated phases of a
shared object.
System model
We consider a system of N sites of users which can operate
independently on replicas. Each site keeps a document (repli-
cated object) as a log of operations that have been performed
during collaborative process. An object can be as large as a
database (i.e. Bayou) or as small as a single file (i.e. WinFS
file). An object is created at one site and propagated to other
sites which contain a replica of the object. A site may repli-
cate an object to any other sites. When a site which keeping
a replica receives the updates, a process called replica syn-
chronization will be performed. During synchronization, it
requires to detect the concurrency and causality between up-
dates of different sites. Also, it requires to resolve conflict
if it occurs between concurrent updates. Replicas are con-
sistent if their states are identical when they have the same
set of operations. Two replicas are consistent after synchro-
nization if each replica is maintained correctly. To ensure this
we use authenticator after each sharing of replicated object.
Operation-based replication maintains a history of operations
and with operation transfer, only missing operations are sent
to bring other replicas up-to-date (i.e. anti-entropy propaga-
tion with minimal traffic overhead). Receiving replicas up-
dates new operations to their logs. From the log it is pos-
sible to see what are user contributions to different parts of
the document and when these contributions were generated.
Two users can make progress independently on the shared
document. The changes are propagated in weakly consistent
manner. It means user can decide when, with whom and what
data to be sent and synchronized.
Definition 1. An operation-based replicated object in a sys-
tem of N sites is a log of operations which were performed
to transfer a documentD from an initial version V0 to a final
version Vk. Operations can be seen in different granular-
ity, such as, lines or paragraphs in document, or deltas be-
tween revisions. Each operation recorded in the log is called
an event. A shared object is considered as a log of events
L = [e1, e2, ..., ek]. Each event is parameterised by systems
or applications.
In the operation-based replication system, the input of syn-
chronization is a common initial state and logs of operations
that were performed on each replica. The system merges the
logs in some fashion, and replays the operations in the merged
log against the initial state to yield a reconciled version. Logs
provide the history of site operations which can help to in-
fer information about user’s intents and therefore potentially
more powerful.
For instance, in Fig.1 each site has an initial version V0.
At a later time, sites create or synchronize new updates on
each single replica to create new versions as logs of oper-
ations by manipulating with lines or paragraph of the doc-
ument such as V1 = [op1, op2], V2 = [op1, op3, op4],
V3 = [op1, op2, op5], V4 = [op1, op2, op5, op3, op4],
V5 = [op1, op2, op5, op4, op3] .
Users store operations in their logs in an order that is con-
sistent with generation order. The collaboration of users in-
volves logs reconciliation. When a user u receives a remote
log L from a remote user v through anti- entropy propagation
[1], u elects new events from L to append to his log L. Log
synchronization of any two replicas ensures duplicate elimi-
nation.
Causality and Concurrency
As users perform updates locally, replicas diverge from one
another. Operations isolated on one site are propagated to
other sites and are integrated or replayed there to make sites
convergent. However replicas might not converge if they exe-
cute operations in different orders. As the Lamport definition
of causality, two operations opa and opb generated at sites
i and j are in causal dependency opa → opb if: opa hap-
pened before opb and i = j; or the execution of opa at site j
happened before the generation of opb. Otherwise they are
concurrent (opa || opb), that means neither opa → opb nor
opb → opa.
Since the log is an operation-based replicated document, it is
possible to replay operations to get a state-based document.
In order to guarantee convergence, it requires techniques to
maintain and execute operations in correct orders, such as
enforcing total order of operations before execution or using
operational transformation, or using commutative replicated
data type (CRDT) such as Logoot [15] in which concurrent
operations can be replayed in variant orders. Note that as
concurrency can occur in the replication, the orders of con-
current operations might vary in logs. Thus authenticators
are designed to protect causality while allow variant orders of
concurrent operations.
Reconciliation
A sequence of events either isolated or reconciled from other
users are added to the log. We assume reconciliation process
modifies one log so that it becomes the union of the two logs
by adding new operations to the end of the log with respect
the order as in original logs. As we mentioned previously
that replica diffusion uses anti-entropy mechanism which pre-
serves causality orders of operations and the reconciliation
ensures causality of operations as well as allows that concur-
rent operations appear in logs in variant orders.
When a sending site sends a document to a receiving site,
it creates an authenticator for its log to attach with the sent
document. The receiving site creates a new authenticator
when it receives the document. We assume each site involved
in the update process possesses a cryptographic public key
pair that is corresponded to a unique site identifier and that
all the other users can retrieve the public key of each other.
This assumption is reasonable in practice [14, 9]. The key
pair is used to sign entries of log that prevent malicious sites
modifying events on behalf of other users. Though sites can
choose a public key pair on their-own, to limit Sybil attacks
[2] we can require each site possesses a digital certificate from
trusted certification authority or have an offline channel (such
as email) to identified the owner of public keys. In either
case the certification authority plays no role in creating au-
thenticator process, and it is used only during initial phrase
when a site joins the system. We also use cryptographic hash
function H with properties collision- and preimage-resistant.
The collision-resistant property can be used to establish the
uniqueness of logs at a certain moment when an authentica-
tor is created.
Vulnerabilities to document
In optimistic replication, the correctness of document history
is based on the trustworthiness of users who maintain its own
ordering of versions correctly such as when a user generates
new updates, the order of new version should follow all pre-
vious versions. Unfortunately a malicious user can always
generate phony updates to forge the history or alter the or-
der of versions. This attacks make the document inconsistent
among replicas. Users can update corrupted data from ma-
licious site and discard data from valid site. Replicas with
corrupted update might never converge with other valid repli-
cas while victim site whose updates were lost and this is re-
ally problematic in replication system. In Fig.1 we present
an example of a malicious site that generates phony updates
without being detected.
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Figure 1. An attack to document log. User A modifies version V4 to
create V’4 by changing causal order of op3 and op4, and then shares
it with user C. C will never know that V’4 contains corrupted update
based on data received from user B.
There are two types of malicious users that are insider and
outsider. We consider in this paper an inside adversary who
has full rights to access to replicated object. Such an adver-
sary might want to alter the process including actions per-
formed on data of authorized contributors. For example when
Alice provides a document to Bob who can perform and con-
tribute new updates to the document, he should not be able
to modify history of actions that Alice performed which were
recorded in document log. The main goals of an adversary in-
clude: alerting existing records or adding forged information
to logs (this might include involve forging other individual
events, changing the order of events, or adding forged events
into the log).
Our work assumes only adversaries who act inside of a sys-
tem since we cannot stop an adversary from copying data to
create a new document and claim at a later time as owner. It
might be possible if an adversary remove completely the log
of operations, however in such case it means the document
will be removed. We can deal with other types of adversary
(insider or outsider) with the support of trusted platform or
system; however we do not consider this assumption in our
system model.
The replication-based collaboration the secure of data items
during the document collaborative workflows has gained in-
creasing importance. As an example, if Bob receives a docu-
ment and processes a part thereof and then forward to Claude,
the operation-based document should include the chronology
of actions that each user (Alice, Bob, Claude) performed on
the document.
AUTHENTICATOR
In this section we are going to present our approach to cre-
ate authenticator A in details which can ensure integrity and
authenticity and suffer Byzantine attacks for operation-based
optimistic replication.
Authenticator
In our context, we define authenticator as follow:
Definition 2. An authenticator is a log tamper-evident de-
noted as A which captures a sub sequence of one or more
events (operations) of the log in one updating session to pro-
tect their integrity and authenticity; where an updating ses-
sion at one user’s site is considered as a duration before
the user sends or receives subsequent updates to/from other
users.
For illustration this definition, let consider at a site of user u
at certain writing session the log is [e1, e2, e3, e4, e5]. The
user u creates an authenticator A for these events with will-
ingness that when the log is synchronized at other replicas, it
cannot be tampered by receiver, for example, the receiver re-
orders e1 and e2 to change the causal-dependency of e1 and
e2.
Definition 3. Each authenticator A as a tuple 〈ID, SIG,
POS, IDE, PRE, SYN〉 holds:
• ID: identifier of authenticator including site identifiers U
(and V ) who commits (and receives) the authenticator and
an event identifier that the authenticator is linked to;
• SIG: the value (signature signed by a public key PK of a
user U to verify the authenticator later) of a certain state
of document D based on operations;
• IDE: a list of identifiers of events which are used in the
SIG;
• PRE, SYN: identifiers of preceding and receiving authenti-
cators used to compute value of the authenticator;
Definition 4. The SIG of an authenticatorA at a certain up-
date is computed as a signature of a cumulative hash by a
sender S or a receiver R, where the sender computes SIG
of the latest authenticator ASn .SIG = σS{H(A
S
n−1 || E)}
with a condition that E 6= ∅; and the receiver computes
ARm = σR{H(A
R
m−1 || E ||A
S
n)} with a condition that
ARm−1 6= ∅ or A
S
n 6= ∅ or E 6= ∅;
where,
• ASn: the last n
th authenticator committed by sender;
• ARm: the lastm
th authenticator committed by receiver;
• E = [ei1 || ei2 || ... eir ]: subsequent updates generated
after preceding authenticator;
• (σu{H(⊙|| . . . ||⊙)} denotes the concatenated arguments
are hashed and signed with user u’s private key).
When a user shares a document by sending the whole log,
he creates an authenticator for log events computed based on
preceding authenticator, new updated events. The authentica-
tor is signed by his private key and linked to the last event of
the log. At the receiving site, the receiver performs reconcili-
ation and creates a new authenticator up on reception.
The authenticators of a log of operations are constructed
whenever a site sends or receives a new update to/from an-
other site. An authenticator is created in following cases:
• A site sends new updates to other sites. In this case, if a site
sends a document without new updates, no new authenti-
cator is created.
• A site receives new updates from other sites. In this case,
the receiving site will check the remote log, detect and re-
solve conflicts (if there are some conflicts of operations).
After these actions, if there are new updates that are added
to the receiver’s log, new authenticator is created for these
new updates.
As an example, we consider three sites A, B and C who
collaboratively work through a shared object as a document
with the initial version V0/{op1}. Each site performs iso-
lated updates on the initial version to contribute to the ob-
ject. In detail, site A, B create new versions V1/{op1, op2}
and V2/{op1, op3, op4} independently. At a later time site A
reconciles with updates from site B to achieve new version
V4/{op1, op2, op5, op3, op4}.
Fig. 1 shows one of vulnerabilities to forge versions. In this
scenario, site A changes the content of reconciled version V4
to forged version V ′
4
for her purpose. Later when site A shares
the forged version V ′
4
to site C, site C cannot know this ver-
sion contains corrupted data that site A performed on the up-
dates of site B. Also if site C then receives version V2 from
site B, site C cannot know which version either V2 or V
′
4
con-
tains correct content.
Our proposal with authenticators is one solution to avoid
this forge. When user B shares his replica first time with
user A, he creates an authenticator AB
1
. As definition 4 to
compute authenticator for a sender, AB
1
is computed with
AB
1
.SIG = σPKB{H(op1 ||op3 ||op4)}. An the authenticator
is described fully as AB
1
= 〈 ID:{B, 1}, AB
1
.SIG, POS:op4,
IDE:op1, op3, op4, PRE:∅, SYN:∅ 〉. When user A receives
updates from user B, she performs synchronization and up-
dates only new operations to the log, and creates an authen-
ticator for new version of document, AA
1
where AA
1
.SIG =
σPKB{H(op1|| op2|| op5|| A
B
1
)}, and AA
1
= 〈 ID:{A, 1},
AA
1
.SIG, POS:op4, IDE:op1, op2, op5, PRE:∅, SYN:A
B
1
〉.
These authenticators are linked to event op4. When C re-
ceives the document from A, he updates new changes to his
replica and creates a new authenticator AC
1
. Later on, C re-
ceives the document from B but since no events are new to C
no new authenticator is created.
Now we discuss that the authenticators created on this exam-
ple can guarantee the integrity and authenticity of replicas.
Let consider the case site A wants to forge version V4 which is
reconciled from V2 and V3. Since site A receives op3 and op4
from site B with authenticatorAB
1
, and then A changes the or-
der of op3 and op4, this tampering will be detected by C when
A sends the forged version to C. AuthenticatorAB
1
guarantees
that A cannot forge operations on behalf of B. Similarly au-
thenticator AA
1
guarantees that C cannot forge operations on
behalf of A.
Algorithms
We present in details algorithms to create and verify authen-
ticators in the following subsections.
Constructing authenticator
Since an authenticator is computed from preceding authenti-
cator of the log, the current events and the authenticator of
synchronized log, the input data to compute authenticator are
two logs at site U and V, two sets of authenticators ZU and
ZV . If it is the first authenticator, one of these parameters can
be empty. In Algorithm 1, if L’ = ∅ then there is no remote
log to synchronize and it is the case when a sender computes
an authenticator before sending his updates. The condition
E 6= ∅ ensures that an authenticator is created only if the
sender has generated new updates; otherwise the sender sends
the log without computing any new authenticator.
Note that when synchronizing replicas, their authenticators
that are linked to operations must be also synchronized so that
all events from remote replica are authenticated when they are
appended to other replicas.
For the complexity analysis, we assume the size of logs L
and L′ are treated as constants. We consider time and space
complexities ofA in algorithms of constructing authenticator
and verifying authenticator.
An authenticator construction in Algo.1 is O(1) in time, and
O(|∆|) in storage, where ∆ is the maximum number of
events that are linked to A.IDE to keep a list of events.
Since authenticator is created each time a site sends or re-
ceives (so-called interaction) updates, the number of authen-
Input:
A log L of site U and an authenticator set ZU ;
A log L’ of a site V and an authenticator set ZV ;
The last authenticator of L:AU
n−1
;
The last authenticator of L’:AVm;
Output: new authenticator created by U:AUn
begin1
E← [ei1 , ..., eir ] as new events added by U to L from lastA
U
n−1
;2
if L′ = ∅ then3
if E 6= ∅ then4
AUn .ID← 〈 U, eir 〉;5
AUn .SIG← σu{H(A
U
n−1
||ei1 ||...||eir )};6
ABn .IDE← ei1 , ..., eir ;7
ABn .PRE←A
U
n−1
.ID;8
ABn .SYN← ∅;9
end if10
end if11
else12
ifAU
n−1
6= ∅ orAVm 6= ∅ or E 6= ∅ then13
AUn .ID← 〈 U, eir 〉;14
AUn .SIG← σu{H(A
U
n−1
||ei1 ||...||eir ||A
V
m)};15
ABn .IDE← ei1 , ..., eir ;16
ABn .PRE←A
U
n−1
.ID;17
ABn .SYN←A
V
m.ID;18
end if19
end if20
Z
U ← ZU ∪ ZV ;21
Add(ZU ,AUn );22
end23
Algorithm 1: Authenticator construction
ticators on a replicated object created by a site u is the total
number of interactions the site performed during the develop-
ment process of the object. Let |Γ| be the total number inter-
actions of one site, each site needs O(Γ · |∆|) space. In syn-
chronization, one log is updated to become the union of two
logs, and the new log shall result withO(Γ · |∆U |+Θ · |∆V |)
space, where ∆U and ∆V are maximum number of events
authenticated in any authenticator of U and V. We can see the
storage complexity depends on the number of interactions and
the number of events between two interactions.
Auditing authenticator
The algorithm algo. 2 presents a mechanism to verify au-
thenticators. When a user receives a document as a log of
operations together with authenticators, he verifies these au-
thenticators against to events in the log. The main idea of the
verification is to check the authenticity of events with valid
authenticators. Thus a log with either events are not authen-
ticated or they are authenticated by invalid authenticators is
unauthorized. An authenticator is checked by verifying its
digital signature. In the verification not only the content but
also the order of events are taken into account. If the cor-
rupted data or falsified order of updates were introduced, au-
thenticators will not be valid corresponding to the events and
the verification algorithm returns negative result. Authenti-
cators help to aware attacks and once the log is detected as
unauthorized, the user who sent the log is made accountable
for the misbehavior.
Authenticator verification has O(1) complexity in space and
Input:
A log L of site U;
A list of authenticators ALU ;
Output:
A boolean result AUTH, misbehaving site M (if found)
begin1
LetQ be a queue storing authenticators to be verified;2
Q← AUn ∈ AL
U ;3
verified← TRUE;4
whileQ 6= ∅ do5
Get authenticatorA fromQ;6
Extract ID, U, PK, SIG, POS, IDE, PRE, SYN fromA;7
Verify SIG by public key PK on signed data of8
H(PRE||IDE||SYN) ;
if order/content of events in IDE and order of PRE,IDE valid then9
Marked events in L with identifiers ∈ IDE;10
Add(Q, PRE);11
Add(Q, SYN);12
end if13
else14
verified← FALSE;15
end if16
end while17
if exist event e ∈ L not marked) or (verified = FALSE) then18
AUTH← FALSE; M← U;19
end if20
else21
AUTH← TRUE; M← ∅;22
end if23
return AUTH, M;24
end25
Algorithm 2: Authenticator verification
O(Γ) in time, where Γ is the total number of authenticators
in the log of replica. Since authenticators in a log are linked
as a chain in which an authenticator is linked to a preceding
one, it is enough to authenticate the log by checking the last
authenticator in a log. This checking process requires to pass
through all preceding authenticators, and that makes the time
complexity depends on the total number of all authenticators.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we addressed security challenges in operation-
based optimistic replication systems. To ensure integrity
and authenticity of logs of operations during collaborative
process, authenticators are computed and attached to logs
as replicated objects. We argue that authenticators work
for operation-based replication systems while existing ap-
proaches cannot be directly applied to such systems. While
tamper-resistance is impossible to be ensured in replication
systems, tamper-detection should be guaranteed. We pre-
sented an approach for securing logs that made misbehaving
users accountable in a peer-to-peer environment where there
is no central authority. We plan to apply our approach on
real traces of collaboration such as on available projects de-
veloped using Mercurial and measure the complexity of our
approach in this case.
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